Abstract-Emerging Camera Sensor Networks (CSN) leverage the collaboration, processing and communication capabilities of modern cameras to handle a wide variety of security and safety-critical tasks, including target tracking. However, the performance of CSN in terms of tracking accuracy can be severely degraded when faults occur. Faults may be caused by unpredictable software errors (e.g., in the image processing, feature extraction and data association modules), hardware malfunctions (e.g., in the camera mechanical parts or lens), or as the result of a malicious attack. We propose a decentralized CSN-based system for tracking multiple targets that mitigates the effect of faulty cameras. According to our findings, the proposed solution can well handle faulty camera observations and is able to reliably track a number of targets that may change over time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are deployed for enabling a wide variety of applications, including target tracking. Such systems are envisioned to provide uninterrupted and reliable network operation while performing the intended task inside the monitoring area, even in hostile environments or in case of unpredictable events. In this context, individual nodes are likely to suffer faults because of harsh environmental conditions (e.g., high temperatures, exposure to radiation, etc.) or exhibit erroneous behaviour due to a malicious attack. Moreover, Byzantine faults may also occur, for instance, nodes might report that they have detected a specific target while the target is not present and vice versa. Such behaviours are attributed to board overheating, battery depletion, software bugs [1] or they can be the result of a malicious attack [2] .
Several works discuss solutions for increasing robustness to faults in traditional WSN to maintain an adequate level of tracking accuracy. For instance, in the case of sensors providing scalar readings (e.g., level of received signal strength, magnitude of acoustic or electromagnetic wave, etc.), mean value [3] or median value [4] filtering have been applied to mitigate the effect of erroneous observations. Binary WSN, where nodes report that they either detect a target or not within their sensing range, have also been studied for robust target tracking [5] . Interestingly, binary WSN that follow either centralized [6] or decentralized network architectures [7] were shown to tolerate a significant number of faulty sensors without severe tracking accuracy degradation.
Camera Sensor Networks (CSN) offer advanced sensing and collaboration capabilities and are becoming increasingly popular for target identification and tracking applications [8] , [9] . However, these systems assume that CSN operate under fault-free conditions and do not take into account possible malfunctions or software errors that may disrupt normal operation. In particular, modern cameras, which are usually equipped with high-end visual sensors and on-board processors, may frequently fail. For instance, a camera may fail to detect and identify a specific target, due to software errors, miscalculations in the image processing algorithms or hardware faults in the lens or mechanical parts. In such case, the faulty camera would falsely report that the target is not present, while it moves inside its field of view, or it may mistake a specific target for another one. Alternatively, consider the surveillance system of a critical infrastructure (e.g., power plant, airport, military camp, etc.). In an attack scenario, the attacker might place a decoy picture of the target-free facility in front of a camera to avoid triggering an alarm during trespassing.
Solutions for improving fault tolerance in WSN [3] - [7] are not directly applicable to CSN due to the directional sensing and limitations in the coverage area (i.e., field of view) of cameras. Surprisingly, only a few works have addressed this issue in the context of CSN. For instance, authors in [10] focus on a specific fault during target tracking, i.e., errors in the horizontal orientation of cameras due to initial calibration inaccuracies (modelled as Gaussian noise) and external effects that cause the orientation to take arbitrary values (modelled as random orientation bias). To this end, we have recently proposed a flexible fault model to generate noisy measurements and different types of realistic faults, which may degrade target tracking accuracy in CSN [11] .
In this work we make the following contributions. First, we propose a decentralized method to determine whether a camera is faulty or healthy. This is implemented as a fault detection module that runs concurrently with target tracking for identifying faulty cameras, thus ignoring the corresponding erroneous observations. Second, we present a decentralized system that is capable of tracking multiple targets in CSN. Our solution enables the selection of a leader camera close to each target in a cooperative fashion, while targets may enter or exit the field dynamically. Subsequently, every leader is responsible for fusing camera observations within its neighbourhood and running the localization and tracking tasks. At the same time, the fault detection mechanism filters out faulty observations that might otherwise affect tracking performance. Simulation results indicate that our target tracking solution can reliably track a varying number of targets despite the presence of faulty cameras.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II we formulate the problem of target tracking in CSN and introduce our models. Section III presents the details of our decentralized multiple target tracking solution. In Section IV we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed solution and report its performance in terms of fault detection accuracy and tracking error in the presence of faulty cameras. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in Section V.
II. MODELLING
We define the following camera network, camera sensing, fault injection and target movement models for the CSN target tracking application.
A. Camera Network Model
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A square field A that is discretized using grid G of N g grid points with coordinates g n = (x n , y n ), n = 1, . . . , N g , while the grid resolution is G s . 
|| is the Euclidean distance between cameras c i and c n . Such information is encapsulated in the system network graph, which is known in advance. 4) A set of N t targets T = {t 1 , . . . , t Nt } moving inside A. At time step k each target is located at p j (k) = (x j (k), y j (k)), j = 1, . . . , N t , while the number of targets may change over time.
B. Camera Sensing Model
All cameras have the same sensing range R s that depends on the imaging capabilities of the hardware. In the following we define different areas of interest that depend on R s .
The Field of View of camera c i , denoted F i ⊆ G, is the subset of grid points g n ∈ G where c i can sense the presence of a target. Typically, by projecting the 3D visual sensing cone of camera c i onto the 2D field A, F i can be approximated by a triangle with height equal to R s and the angle of F i is 2α; see the illustration in Fig. 1 .
However, camera c i may not be able to determine the exact location of a target inside F i . This is typical with cheap cameras, which may suffer manufacturing impairments in the visual sensor or inaccuracies in the image processing algorithms that introduce uncertainty (noise) in target location. Hence, a subregion (zone) inside F i where the target resides is usually reported, rather than a single location.
The Zone of View of camera c i , denoted Z i,m ⊆ F i , where m = 1, . . . , N z , is the subset of grid points g n ∈ F i where c i can sense the presence of a target. In this sense, F i is divided into a number of non-overlapping sensing zones such that
The notion of zones is depicted in Fig. 1 for camera c 3 . We assume that camera c i can consistently identify each target within F i by employing appropriate distributed data association mechanisms; see [12] and references therein. Subsequently, it indicates the corresponding Z i,m where target t j lies. In this sense, the detection status A j i,m (k) of camera c i pertaining to target t j at time step k is given by
If camera c i detects target t j inside Z i,m then A j i,m (k) = 1 and sends a message to all neighbouring cameras c n ∈ N i ; otherwise, it remains silent. The detection statuses A j i,m are forwarded to a camera in the vicinity of the target acting as leader; see Section III-A for the details of our distributed directional leader election protocol. The leader combines relevant information from its set of neighbours to estimate the current location of target t j , as discussed in Section III-B. In real-life applications, however, camera c i may not always be able to reliably determine the correct zone where a target resides. For instance, it may report that the target is located inside a neighbouring zone due to faults in the target detection module. In another case, camera c i may falsely report that a target is not present, e.g., when the target passes behind an obstacle while the target is actually there, or a detection message may be dropped due to network operation reasons. Alternatively, camera c i may wrongly report that a target is present inside F i , e.g., by confusing one target with another one due to errors in the image processing algorithms.
All such scenarios degrade sensing accuracy and may introduce faults in camera observations, which affect the decisions that are made based on these observations.
C. Fault Model
We employ our probabilistic fault model [11] to simulate the undesired effects described above. This model disturbs the ideal measurements of camera c i pertaining to target t j , i.e., the detection statuses A j i,m , according to probability
In case target t j is located inside Z i,m , then we have the following possibilities:
• P • P f n ij : P[c i falsely does not sense t j ]. In this event A j i,m = 0, ∀m, i.e., false negative observation. Alternatively, in case target t j is located outside F i , then we have the following possibilities:
• P We employ this model to simulate different types of faulty behaviour. In particular, by increasing P f n ij , while decreasing P c ij accordingly, we are able to simulate random temporary faults where the faulty cameras do not report the presence of a target. Similarly, by adjusting P w ij we simulate the performance degradation of the target detection module owing to harsh environmental conditions, optical calibration errors, or due to prolonged operation time, while by controlling P f p ij we generate false detections across the field, e.g., in case a target is detected when it is not actually within the field of view or target t j is mistaken for another target t j ′ . This model can be used to simulate permanent as well as spatially correlated faults (see [11] for more details), however in this work we consider temporary faults.
D. Target Mobility and Measurement Model
We assume that target t j is traversing the field according to a linear discrete-time process disturbed by noise
where
is the state of target t j at time step k containing the target location p
, while w j (k) represents process noise. The observation vector z j (k) measures the target location that is estimated by the underlying localization algorithm and u j (k) represents measurement noise, i.e., the uncertainty in the estimated target location.
III. MULTIPLE TARGET TRACKING A. Directional Leader Camera Election Protocol
The directional Leader Camera Election Protocol (LCEP) elects a leader c l in a distributed fashion, which will be responsible for handling the localization and tracking tasks, among the cameras that detect target t j ; see [11] for a detailed description of the LCEP protocol. In a nutshell, LCEP employs information from the effective neighbours of each camera c i (Definition 1 in [11] ), which share overlapping fields of view, in the leader election process and subsequently in the localization of target t j . Note that the number of targets is not known in advance and LCEP leads to the election of one leader for each target identified.
B. Voting-based Localization and Tracking
where q is the index of associated grid points and n is the index of related neighbouring cameras.
The main idea is that if camera c n senses target t j , then it is certain about its presence inside F n . Thus, c n upvotes (+1) the grid points that fall inside its detection zone Z n,m , while it downvotes (−1) the grid points of other zones. Similarly, if camera c n does not sense a target, then it downvotes all the grid points inside F n because A j n,m ′ = 0, ∀m ′ . Finally, camera c n is uncertain about the presence of a target outside F n , thus contributing 0 to the corresponding grid points. Using ±1 values in such voting scheme was shown to be effective in target localization and tracking applications, while tolerating a large number of faulty binary sensor observations [13] . Subsequently, for each grid point g q , c l sums the contributions of neighbouring cameras pertaining to target t j to obtain the voting result V j q as
Target t j is localized at the grid point with the maximum voting value given by
or at the centroid of those grid points that have the same maximum value. Figure 2 exemplifies the application of our localization algorithm in a simple scenario.
C. Location Smoothing
After estimating target location, the leader employs Kalman filter to smooth rough estimates provided by the localization algorithm. When a new leader is to be elected, as discussed previously, current leader passes on to the next leader the required information to continue computations within the Kalman filter algorithm, thus ensuring uninterrupted tracking for target t j . The Kalman filter algorithm is based on the target state and measurement models of equations (2) and (3). We assume that the process noise is drawn from a zero mean Gaussian distribution, i.e., w j (k) ∼ N (0, Q j ) with covariance matrix Q j = Q = σ 2 Q I, where I denotes the 2 × 2 identity matrix. Parameter σ Q is related to the target dynamics and an appropriate value may be selected according to the expected target mobility behaviour. Taking into account the fact that the random vehicle (target) acceleration a(k) is Rayleigh distributed with parameter σ 2 Q and expected value E(a(k)) = σ Q π/2, as discussed in [14] , we set σ
2 /π whereā denotes the average target acceleration. Essentially, a lowā value is appropriate for a steady moving target (e.g., velocity does not change rapidly), while a higher value ensures that the Kalman filter can keep track of accelerated targets; see the results in Section IV.
We also assume that the noise disturbing the measurements, i.e., location estimates, follows a zero mean Gaussian distribution u j (k) ∼ N (0, R j ) with covariance matrix R j = R = σ 2 R I. Parameter σ R reflects uncertainty in the target location estimates. Hence, it can be set according to the mean localization error achieved by the voting-based algorithm based on offline tests.
Equations (7)- (11) below form the Kalman filter iterative algorithm that is used for estimating target state x j (k) at time step k. The predicted state vector and error covariance matrix are denoted x j (k) and C j (k), respectively. The produced filtered quantities based on observations (i.e., location estimates z j (k)) are denotedx j (k) andĈ j (k), respectively.
where A j (k) = A, B j (k) = B and H j (k) = H are the design matrices in equations (2) and (3), which are the same for all targets and are assumed to be constant in time.
The state vector is initialised asx
T is the first estimated location for target t j using the localization algorithm, while the initial velocity is assumed zero. Also, the error covariance matrix is initialized at
where v is the upper bound for the initial velocity variance.
D. Fault Detection
Current leader c l leverages the filtered target location to decide whether neighbouring cameras that have contributed in localizing the target are either healthy or faulty. In particular, the observations used by the leader to update the health state of neighbouring cameras are given by the fault detection signal f n (k) ∈ {0, 1}, where f n (k) = 1 signifies that camera c n is faulty.
This binary signal is computed based on the detection status A j n,m of camera c n and the filtered target location
T and is formally given by
13) According to equation (13) the leader decides that camera c n is faulty, i.e., f n = 1, in case it reports that target t j is sensed inside zone Z n,m but the filtered target locationp j is not inside that zone or alternatively in case c n reports that it does not sense the target but the filtered target locationp j is inside its field of view F n . On the other hand, camera c n is considered healthy, i.e., f n = 0, in case it reports that target t j is sensed inside zone Z n,m andp j falls inside that zone or in case c n reports that target t j is not sensed andp j does not fall inside its field of view F n . Note that the leader camera is capable to make these decisions because information about the areas covered by the zones of all neighbouring cameras are stored locally.
In this sense, current leader is able to update the health state of neighbouring cameras that contribute to target localization, thus ignoring contributions from those cameras considered as faulty. When the next leader is to be elected, current leader passes on these health state information.
This fault detection strategy is quite intuitive and essentially it says that the state of cameras close to the current leader can be reliably determined based on the filtered target locationp j . Our simulation results in Section IV-A indicate that it performs reasonably well in terms of fault detection accuracy. However, in the target tracking problem that we address, it is not possible to fully trust this location estimate because it may occasionally deviate from the actual target location, e.g., in areas covered only by a few cameras or due to inaccuracies in the localization algorithm. This may lead to wrong decisions or frequent changes of the health state for some cameras that may affect future target localization steps. As part of our ongoing work, we are investigating robust schemes that follow a Bayesian approach to improve fault detection accuracy.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In our simulation setup, A is a 100 × 100 square CSN field with grid resolution G s = 2 units. There are N c = 150 randomly deployed cameras, which have the same hardware characteristics and their field of view is equilateral triangle, as shown in Fig. 1 , with height equal to the sensing range R s = 30 units. There are three targets t j , j = 1, . . . , 3 that appear inside the field at different time instances and traverse the field following different paths. When a camera detects t j it reports its presence inside a specific zone and the number of zones is N z = 5. This information is shared with neighbouring cameras located within communication range R c = 45 units for collaboratively tracking these three target. We have set σ R = 2, whileā = 1 ⇒ σ Q = 2/π. Figure 3 illustrates a scenario with three targets moving on straight line paths at constant speed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed multiple target tracking solution.
To simulate camera faults, we employ the fault model described in Section II-C, and assume that it is the same for all cameras and targets , i.e., P ij = P = [P c P w P f n P r P f p ]. We start with P = [1 0 0 1 0] to simulate fault-free conditions and then investigate the fault detection capabilities and fault tolerance of our solution by varying one of the probabilities P w , P f n and P f p , while keeping others constant.
A. Fault Detection Accuracy
We start by investigating the performance of our fault detection mechanism for different types of faults. We consider only one target traversing the field and compute the mean of each quantity over the target path; see Fig. 4a and Fig. 4d . Each point in the curves corresponds to a fault probability value and is averaged over 20 runs, where each run uses a random camera deployment. Error bars represent the standard deviation for all runs.
Our first observation is that the number of false detections does not vary significantly as the number of faulty cameras increases. That is, on average around two cameras are wrongly determined to be faulty in each case. Importantly, false detections are kept low in the fault-free case, as shown in Fig. 4a for P w = 0. Results also indicate that the number of correct detections is close to the actual number of faults injected in the field. This is true especially for cameras that suffer from false positive faults 1 . In the cases of wrong zone and false negative sensing faults, some faulty cameras may not be detected as shown in Fig. 4a and Fig. 4d . However, these faulty cameras do not severely affect tracking accuracy as it will be shown next.
B. Fault Tolerance
Next, we study the fault tolerance of the proposed tracking system. Essentially, a tracking system is considered faulttolerant if it exhibits smooth performance degradation as the probability of camera faults increases. We compare our system against the following alternative solutions that rely on LCEP for leader election, but employ different localization algorithms instead of our voting-based algorithm.
1) The Centroid Estimator (CE) [4] , which localizes the target at the centroid of the grid points that fall into the detection zones of those cameras that detect the target in the neighbourhood of the current leader.
2) The Closest Point Approach (CPA) [15] , which localizes the target at the centroid of the grid points that fall into the detection zone of the current leader.
3) The Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator [16] . In the case of ML-based localization, the tracking error explodes when false negative observations occur, as shown in Fig. 4b , due to the fact the likelihood of a target to reside in a specific area is greatly reduced even if a single camera reports that it does not observe the target within its field of view. The proposed solution exhibits smooth performance degradation as P f n increases outperforming both CE and CPA that are not affected by this type of fault because they consider only those cameras that detect the target. On the other hand, false positive observations severely affect CE and CPA because both algorithms are very sensitive to cameras that falsely report that they have detected the target. This is in contrast with the proposed solution that can tolerate a significant number of false positive observations, as discussed in [11] .
The tracking performance for different number of cameras is illustrated in Fig. 4e , where we have fixed P f p = 0.2. It is evident that the proposed solution retains a high level of tracking accuracy even when fewer cameras are considered. Similar behaviour was observed for other types of faults.
Finally, we investigate the tracking capabilities of the proposed solution when the target mobility is not stable. a staircase path, while in different legs it is moving either at constant speed (i.e., zero acceleration), or positive, or negative acceleration. Setting the valueā = 1 enables the Kalman filter to keep track of the target despite the changing mobility behaviour. This is also observed in Fig. 4f that plots the tracking error in the presence of wrong zone faults.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We propose a target tracking system that integrates four components, namely the LCEP protocol for leader camera election, a voting-based target localization algorithm, a location smoothing module based on Kalman filter and a faulty camera detection mechanism. This system is shown to be effective for tracking multiple targets in CSN when faulty cameras are considered. In particular, simulation results indicate that our solution can tolerate different types of faults and keep tracking error low as more cameras become faulty.
